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1 Introduction
Business cycle fluctuations in advertising have gained attention recently, as has the time devoted
by households to shopping activities. We describe the behavior of advertising and household time
allocation in a natural way, using a customer search and matching framework, in which some mar-
kets display sticky nominal price-setting. To capture the cyclical swings in advertising in U.S. data,
we first estimate the model, conditional on exogenous fiscal and monetary policy. The estimation
reveals that a large departure from efficient pricing in advertising-based markets (“customer mar-
kets”) is required to capture the empirical advertising volatility along with its strong correlation
with GDP. Inefficient customer market pricing is due to congestion externalities that are inherent
in matching markets. Given the estimated policy and non-policy parameters, we analyze optimal
fiscal and monetary policy in the tradition of Lucas and Stokey (1983), Chari, Christiano, and Ke-
hoe (1991), Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004), and others. A key question is whether optimal policy
can restore efficiency in customer search markets as well as mitigate distortions arising through the
well-understood sticky-price channel.
Under optimal policy, aggregate business-cycle comovements – for example, GDP, labor, and
total consumption — are not much affected by replacement of exogenous policy in the estimated
model by endogenous optimal policy. However, Ramsey-optimal volatility in advertising is much
smaller than in the data. This result arises because the Ramsey government offsets congestion
externalities in customer markets. However, when nominal prices are sticky (as we estimate that
they are) monetary policy has little to do with this result; rather, it is fiscal policy that has powerful
effects on stabilizing trade in customer markets. An important point that arises from our results
is that empirically-observed advertising volatility is inefficiently too high.
Efficient pricing in customer markets is achieved by extreme volatility in several fiscal instru-
ments that are part of a complete system of taxes. Tax rate volatility allows for smoothing the
fluctuations of inefficient “wedges” that arise in the estimated exogenous-policy model. However,
when prices are sticky, optimal monetary policy does not directly target pricing distortions in
customer markets. Instead, consistent with the New Keynesian features of the framework, both
optimal inflation volatility and nominal interest rate volatility are extremely small. In contrast, if
the New Keynesian aspects are removed, optimal inflation volatility is many magnitudes larger, just
as in Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991) and the long line of ensuing research. In fact, optimal
inflation volatility under flexible prices is higher in the model with customer markets than in an
identically calibrated model without customer search.
The set of taxes that forms the complete set is novel and helps understand the nature of the
model, in both positive and normative terms. For example, sales taxes on customer goods help
eliminate externalities in customer market pricing, and swing sharply along the business cycle to
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restore intertemporal efficiency in the dynamics of customer relationships. However, several of the
taxes in the complete set are difficult to map to governments’ policy levers, especially at business-
cycle frequencies; because of this, they are not included in the estimation phase. We thus also
study a Ramsey government that wields an incomplete set of tax instruments: labor-income taxes,
nominal interest rates, and inflation, which are the tax instruments considered in the classical
macro-Ramsey models that exclude lump-sum taxes. Wielding this limited set of instruments,
labor-income taxes become the primary tool for mitigating price distortions in customer markets,
while the role of monetary policy remains, for practical purposes, identical to the model without
customer goods.
The recent focus on advertising can be partially attributed to the fact that advertising expen-
ditures are large — they account for 2.5 percent of GDP over the last 50 years, which has been
recently documented by, among others, Hall (2013). Using a broader definition of intangible ex-
penses that includes advertising, marketing, and brand promotion, D’Erasmo and Moscoso-Boedo
(2013) argue that these expenses can account for up to 13 percent of GDP. Hall (2013) has also
characterized advertising volatility as an important component for understanding business cycles.
In terms of business-cycle horizons, Molinari and Turino (2009) show that quarterly U.S. volatility
in advertising is about three times as volatile as output, highly persistent, and procyclical with
respect to output.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to estimate such a model using Bayesian methods
and consider optimal policy based on the estimates. Our framework brings together several strands
of literature. One strand is the money demand macro-Ramsey approach pioneered by Lucas and
Stokey (1983) and quantified by Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991). Subsequent authors, in-
cluding Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004) and Siu (2004), augment these environments with New
Keynesian frictions, as we also do here. A second strand considers optimal fiscal policy analy-
sis in models with search and matching in labor markets, a recent example of which is Arseneau
and Chugh (2012). A third strand considers the importance of long-lasting customer relationships
for the macroeconomy. This literature includes the nascent macro-advertising literature described
briefly above. While optimal policy has yet to be considered in these models, both Chahrour and
Akinci (2009) and Leith, Moldovan, and Rossi (2012) consider optimal monetary policy in environ-
ments where long-term customer relationships are motivated by good-specific (or “deep”) habits.
Appendix A provides a more detailed review of this third strand of literature and our contribution
to it.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the benchmark exogenous policy
model. Section 3 overviews the estimation procedure for the exogenous policy version of the model
and compares the fit of the model to the data. Section 4 describes the optimal policy problem with
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a complete set of tax instruments, as well as with an incomplete set of instruments, along with
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Economy
Our model begins with the cash-good/credit-good economy described by Lucas and Stokey (1983),
Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1991), and summarized in Chari and Kehoe (1999) — hereafter
referred to as LS, CCK, and CK, respectively — and layers on top of it the sticky price friction
of Rotemberg (1982). The main innovation of our framework relative to this existing literature is
to allow for a fraction of goods to require both buyers and sellers to engage in costly search and
matching prior to engaging in trade. An important idea in our setup, which does not appear in
the recent goods matching and advertising-related macro literature, is that it is realistic that not
all goods markets display costly search; this idea is depicted in Figure 1. We allow the Bayesian
estimation in Section 3 to determine some important parameters of customer markets.1
2.1 An Overview of Goods Trade in the Model
Figure 1 sketches the structure of markets; the parts highlighted in red are the components of our
model that depart from, say, Siu (2004) and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004).2
A continuum of differentiated firms, indexed by i, produce intermediate goods. Each firm i
sets its nominal price pit, taking as given its demand function, and incurs convex costs of nominal
price adjustment a` la Rotemberg (1982). Each firm’s technology has identical and exogenous labor
productivity zt in each period t and produces yit = ztnit, ∀i ∈ (0, 1). These intermediate goods are
sold to firms who then costlessly package them into a homogenous final good. The description so
far is exactly that of a standard New Keynesian framework.
Where the model differs is that only a fraction of these final goods are exchanged in traditional
Walrasian spot markets. For ease of analysis and description, we often refer to final goods producers
that sell their goods in the frictionless market as “Walrasian firms.” The remaining portion of these
goods are sold to consumers through a “customer market” in which relationships must first be
established. This channel requires firms to engage in sunk-cost advertising to attract customers.
The probability that a given advertisement successfully attracts a potential customer is taken as
given by the firm, but is endogenously determined in equilibrium. Hence, the aggregate ratio of
1The marketing literature has documented how customers decide to establish both long-term relationships with
particular firms and anonymous market interactions with others (through spot markets) (Sheth and Shah (2003)).
2Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004) do not use a cash-goods/credit-goods framework as Siu (2004) does (they
instead use an endogenous transactions velocity framework); however, we will use interchangeably both Siu (2004)
and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe as benchmarks because the results each paper arrives at convey the same ideas.
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Walrasian Final Goods Producers 
(spot markets) 
Consumers 
Sell final goods to consumers 
via cash and credit markets 
Differentiated-
goods firm 1 
Differentiated-
goods firm 2 
Differentiated-
goods firm infinity …………………………………………… 
Measure-one continuum of intermediate firms, each of which hires labor on spot markets and sets its 
state-contingent nominal price in each period, given the Rotemberg adjustment cost and the demand 
function it faces 
Non-Walrasian Goods Sellers 
(non-spot “customer markets”) 
1. Pay γ1 and γ2 for each unit of 
advertising to attract cash 
shoppers and credit shoppers 
2. Conditional on successful 
matches, sell final goods via cash 
matching and credit matching 
markets 
Sell final goods 
to non-Walrasian 
firms 
Figure 1: Structure of markets. Differentiated intermediate goods producers hire labor in spot markets
and sell their products to Walrasian final goods producers, who in turn costlessly repackage them into final
goods. A portion of these goods is sold to consumers, and the remaining portion is sold to non-Walrasian
goods sellers. This side of the economy incurs advertising costs to attract customers to whom they sell final
goods in non-spot, long-lasting customer relationships.
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advertisers attempting to attract shoppers to the number of shoppers trying to form new customer
matches (termed “market tightness” in the well-known labor search and matching literature) is
critical for these matching rates, and hence for customer goods’ prices. Congestion externalities
occur because traders on either side of the market do not take into account their effect on aggregate
matching probabilities. Generically, congestion externalities exist in matching markets.
Conditional on successfully attracting a customer, a customer relationship is established. Once
established, the customer relationship persists until it ends in an exogenous separation, which occurs
with a constant probability each period. In order to facilitate comparison with the benchmark
optimal policy models of LS and CCK, our model allows for both cash and credit transactions in
both Walrasian markets and customer markets.
2.2 Households
There is a measure one of identical, infinitely-lived households in the economy, each composed
of a measure one of individuals. In a given period, an individual member of the representative
household can be engaged in one of four activities: searching for cash goods, searching for credit
goods, working, or enjoying leisure. More specifically, lt members of the household are working in
a given period; s1t (s2t) members are searching for customer market firms with which to establish
cash (credit) relationships; and 1− lt−s1t−s2t members are enjoying leisure. Let x1t and x2t stand
for Walrasian cash-good consumption and credit-good consumption, respectively.
Denote by N1t and N2t the pre-existing stocks of customer cash-good relationships and customer
credit-good relationships, respectively. In each relationship, one unit of consumption is traded. In
other words, there is no intensive margin of trade. All goods exchange in customer markets occurs
at the extensive level.
The representative household maximizes expected lifetime utility
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βt [u(x1t, x2t) + ϑv(N1t, N2t)− h(lt + s1t + s2t)] (1)
subject to the sequence of flow budget constraints (which contain several taxes, which are part of
the complete set of tax instruments analyzed in the Ramsey problem)
Mt −Mt−1 +Bt −Rt−1Bt−1 = (1− τ lt−1)Pt−1wt−1lt−1 − Pt−1x1t−1
−Pt−1x2t−1 − P1t−1(1 + τN1t−1)N1t−1
−P2t−1(1 + τN2t−1)N2t−1 + (1− τd)dt−1 + (1− τd
NK
)dNKt−1
+
[
(1− kh1t−1)s1t−1 + (1− kh2t−1)s2t−1
]
Pt−1κ, (2)
cash-in-advance constraints
Ptx1t + P1t
(
1 + τN1t
)
N1t ≤Mt, (3)
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and perceived laws of motion for its cash customer relationships and credit customer relationships
N1t+1 = (1− ρ)(N1t + s1tkh1t) (4)
and
N2t+1 = (1− ρ)(N2t + s2tkh2t), (5)
in which ρ is the customer turnover rate. The within-period timing of financial markets relative to
allocation markets is identical to that in LS and CCK, and we have introduced customer markets
in a symmetric fashion. The importance of customer goods in households’ preferences is captured
by the utility parameter ϑ in (1). As ϑ shrinks to zero, the model nests that of LS, CCK, Siu
(2004), and (effectively) Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004). To capture the idea that some fraction
of customer consumption requires a cash-in-advance constraint, we include N1t in (3).
The perceived probabilities, which are taken as given by individuals searching for new cash
(credit) customer market relationships, are kh1t (k
h
2t).
3 Purchases of customer market goods are
taxed at the rates τN1t and τ
N2
t , and pre-tax labor income wtlt is taxed at the rate τ
l
t . Each
unmatched shopper, whether a cash shopper or a credit shopper, receives a “coupon” κ from the
government.4 Pt denotes the period-t nominal price of any Walrasian good (cash or credit), P1t
denotes the period-t nominal price of a cash customer good, and P2t denotes the period-t nominal
price of a credit customer good. Aggregate profits of the differentiated goods sector are rebated
as lump-sum dividends dNKt−1 to the representative household every period, as are aggregate profits
of the customer market firms dt−1. Because of their lump-sum nature, the optimal tax rate τd
NK
imposed by the Ramsey planner would be 100 percent (as shown by Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2004) and Siu (2004)), and the optimal τd imposed by the Ramsey planner would also be 100
percent (as shown by Arseneau and Chugh (2012)).5
First-order conditions with respect to x1t, x2t lt, s1t, s2t, N1t+1, N2t+1, Mt, and Bt yield (details
are provided in Appendix B) a standard (Walrasian credit) consumption-labor optimality condition
h′(lt + s1t + s2t)
ux2t
= (1− τ lt )wt, (6)
a standard (Walrasian) cash-good/credit-good optimality condition
ux1t
ux2t
= Rt, (7)
3These perceived probabilities will be determined in general equilibrium.
4The coupon κ could be interpreted in different ways. In this paper, we interpret them as government-provided
income.
5For the Ramsey analysis, these 100 percent tax rates are presumed to not generate sufficient revenue to finance
exogenous total government spending.
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and the pricing condition for the one-period nominally risk-free government bond
1 = RtEt
[
βux1t+1
ux1t
1
pit+1
]
, (8)
in which pit ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inflation rate between periods t− 1 and t.6
The two other household optimality conditions that arise are the cash-shopping condition
h′t
ux2t
1
kh1t
−
(
1− kh1t
kh1t
)
κ =
+(1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
ϑvN1t+1
ux2t+1
− p1t+1Rt+1
(
1 + τN1t+1
)
+
h′t+1
ux2t+1
1
kh1t+1
−
(
1− kh1t+1
kh1t+1
)
κ
]}
.
(9)
and the credit-shopping condition
h′t
ux2t
1
kh2t
−
(
1− kh2t)
kh2t
)
κ =
= (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
ϑvN2t+1
ux2t+1
− (1 + τN2t+1)p2t+1 +
h′t+1
ux2t+1
1
kh2t+1
−
(
1− kh2t+1
kh2t+1
)
κ
]}
.
(10)
Each shopping condition equates the marginal cost of sending a member of the household to search
for either a new cash or a new credit customer market relationship to its expected payoff. Taking
the credit shopping condition (10) as an example, the cost is the marginal rate of substitution
(MRS)
h′t
ux2t
. The expected payoff contains two parts. If the credit shopper is unsuccessful in
finding a customer market firm, which occurs with probability 1 − kh2t, the individual (and thus
the household of which he is a member) receives the coupon payoff κ. On the other hand, if the
shopper is successful, which occurs with probability kh2t, the individual (and thus the household
of which he is a member) receives the payoff stated in the second line of (10). This latter payoff
(which begins in period t+1, due to the assumed timing of customer markets), is the MRS between
search credit goods and Walrasian credit goods,
ϑvN2t+1
ux2t+1
, net of the consumer’s after-tax payment.
Because customer market relationships are long-lived, a continuation value also appears in this
payoff. The interpretation of the cash shopping condition (9) is similar, except, because these are
cash goods, the nominal interest rate also appears in the after-tax payment.
6For ease of notation, sometimes we drop the arguments of marginal utility functions. For example, h′(lt + s1t +
s2t) = h
′
t.
7
2.3 Production
2.3.1 Intermediate Goods Firms
As shown in Figure 1, imperfectly substitutable intermediate goods are produced by a continuum
of firms indexed by i, using labor as the only input into production. These intermediate inputs are
then sold to final goods producers. Each intermediate goods firm i sets its nominal price, pi,t, to
maximize monopoly profits subject to the following demand curve for its differentiated intermediate
input
yi,t =
(
pi,t
Pt
)−ε
yt, (11)
in which the elasticity of the demand for firm i’s intermediate input is ε−1ε and aggregate demand
is denoted yt. Each firm i produces using a linear-in-labor technology, yi,t = ztlit, taking as given
the nominal wage Wt, and zt stands for aggregate labor productivity, which we will interchangeably
refer to as total factor productivity (TFP). TFP is assumed to be common across all intermediate
goods producing firms.
For firm i’s profit maximization problem, define the aggregate real wage, wt ≡ WtPt , aggregate
marginal cost, mct =
wt
zt
, and aggregate gross inflation, pit =
Pt
Pt−1 . Each firm i pays a cost,
denominated in aggregate output, of ϕ2
(
pi,t
pi,t−1 − pii
)2
for adjusting prices. Letting Ξt|0 denote the
t-period ahead stochastic discount factor of households, firm i’s problem is
max
pi,t,yi,t
E0
∞∑
t=0
Ξt|0
Pt
pi,tyi,t − Ptmctyit − ϕ
2
(
pi,t
pi,t−1
− pi∗
)2
Pt
 (12)
subject to its demand constraint (11).
Taking the two first order conditions and imposing symmetric equilibrium (pi,t = Pt and yi,t =
yt, ∀i) yields the well-known New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC),
0 = (1− ε+ εmct) yt − ϕ (pit − pi∗)pit + Et
{
Ξt+1|tϕ (pit+1 − pi∗)pit+1
}
. (13)
For the Ramsey problem below, symmetric equilibrium real profits (which are the dividends that
the consumers receive lump-sum in (2)) of the representative intermediate goods producer in period
t are given by
dNKt = (1−mct) yt −
ϕ
2
(pit − pi∗)2. (14)
2.3.2 Final Goods Firms
Again referring to Figure 1, final goods can be sold to households either through a Walrasian
market — meaning the goods are sold directly to consumers in a Walrasian market — or through
a customer market. Customer market sales are conducted in non-Walrasian search and matching
markets that require advertising on the part of customer marketers to attract searching consumers.
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Regardless of which market the goods are purchased in, final goods are produced via Dixit-
Stiglitz bundling of intermediate goods. The price elasticity of demand for each of the intermediate
goods is ε, and thus the elasticity of demand across intermediate producers will be ε−1ε .
Walrasian Market. Firms in Walrasian markets are perfectly competitive, so we can simply
describe the representative Walrasian firm. The representative Walrasian firm produces final goods
according to the CES production function Xj,t =
(∫
x
ε−1
ε
i,t di
) ε
ε−1
, in which xi,t represents units of
intermediate good i used in the production of Walrasian goods.7 Optimization with respect to xi,t
yields the demand function in (11).
Walrasian goods are sold in perfectly competitive markets to both households and customer
marketers. The nominal price of the Walrasian goods is Pt. If all goods are sold in the Walrasian
market, which occurs if the utility weight on customer market goods in the household’s utility
function is ϑ = 0, the model is simply that of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004) and Siu (2004).
Customer Market. Firms in customer markets all face the same costs of advertising and all
sell the same physical object as Walrasian firms, thus we can simply describe the representative
customer market firm. Similar to the representative household, the representative customer market
firm has N1t and N2t pre-existing stocks of customer market cash-good relationships and customer
market credit-good relationships. The representative customer marketer maximizes
max
N1t+1,N2t+1,a1t,a2t
E0
∞∑
t=0
Ξt|0 [(p1t − 1)N1t + (p2t − 1)N2t − (1− τa1t )γ1a1t − (1− τa2t )γ2a2t] (15)
subject to perceived laws of motion
N1t+1 = (1− ρ)(N1t + kf1ta1t) (16)
and
N2t+1 = (1− ρ)(N2t + kf2ta2t). (17)
The relative price for a search cash (credit) good is p1t ≡ P1t/Pt (p2t ≡ P2t/Pt), kf1t (kf2t) is the
probability of a given advertisement yielding a cash (credit) match, a1t (a2t) is advertising to attract
cash (credit) matches, γ1 (γ2) parameterizes the cost of cash (credit) advertising, and τ
a1 (τa2) is
a government subsidy for costly cash (credit) advertising.
The first-order conditions with respect to a1t andN1t+1 and, similarly, a2t andN2t+1, yield a pair
of optimal advertising conditions that characterize customer marketers’ investments in attracting
new customers. These optimal advertising conditions are given by
(1− τa1t )γ1
kf1t
= (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
(
p1t+1 − 1 +
(1− τa1t+1)γ1
kf1t+1
)}
, (18)
7Note that x, p, and X are chosen to describe the firm-level problems in this section only. Thus, for example, pj,t
denotes the nominal price chosen by final goods producer j; it does not denote the Nash-bargained prices p1t or p2t
characterized in Section 2.5 below.
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for cash matches and
(1− τa2t )γ2
kf2t
= (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
(
p2t+1 − 1 +
(1− τa2t+1)γ2
kf2t+1
)}
. (19)
for credit matches.
Intuitively, customer-market firms advertise to the point at which the marginal cost of adver-
tising and successfully forming a new customer relationship (the left-hand side of (18) and (19))
equates with the present value of profits (the right-hand side of (18) and (19)).
2.4 Customer Market Matching
In aggregate, matches between cash (credit) shoppers looking for customer market firms and cus-
tomer marketers’ cash (credit) advertising are formed according to a pair of constant-returns match-
ing technologies, and s1t (s2t) and a1t (a2t) are now considered to be economywide aggregates. The
aggregate law of motion for cash customer relationships is
N1t+1 = (1− ρ) (N1t +m(s1t, a1t)) , (20)
and the aggregate law of motion for credit customer relationships is
N2t+1 = (1− ρ) (N2t +m(s2t, a2t)) . (21)
The aggregate matching function is m(s, a). In the estimation in Section 3 and therefore in the
Ramsey problem in Section 4, the matching functions are identical regardless of customer market
cash or customer market credit, but the inputs s and a can differ.
2.5 Price Determination in Customer Markets
Successful matches generate surpluses that reflect the value of customer relationship capital gener-
ated as a result of the costly search process. The price of these goods — the terms of goods trade
— splits this surplus between both sides of each relationship market.
As is typical in the search and matching literature, we assume this price is determined as the
outcome of a generalized individualistic Nash bargaining process. Specifically, once a match is
formed, both consumers and customer marketers sit down to bargain and ultimately settle on a
price that maximizes the surplus of the match conditional on the bargaining power of customers,
ηi, and customer marketers, 1− ηi for market i ∈ (1, 2) and for ηi ∈ (0, 1). Details of the derivation
are provided in Appendix D; due to space considerations, we present here only the Nash pricing
condition for cash customer goods
p1t = (1− η1)
(
ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
)
+ η1
10
+ η1(1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
Rt+1(1 + τ
N1
t+1)
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
− 1
]
A1t+1
}
, (22)
in which A1t+1 denotes the present value to a firm of a cash customer market customer, and the
Nash pricing condition for credit customer goods
p2t = (1− η2)
(
ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
1 + τN2t
)
+ η2
+ η2(1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
1 + τN2t+1
1 + τN2t
− 1
]
A2t+1
}
, (23)
in which, similarly, A2t+1 denotes the present value to a firm of a credit customer market customer.
We allow for a customer’s bargaining power (η1 vs. η2) to potentially differ across the search-based
cash and credit goods for estimation purposes, as discussed in Section 3. It is also useful to note that
there are a variety of policy tools — indeed, they are part of the complete set of tax instruments —
that can potentially affect prices in relationship markets. The ability of an optimizing government
to use these tax instruments to alter the way the surpluses are split is critical for the Ramsey
problem studied in Section 4.
2.6 Government
The government’s flow budget constraint in nominal terms is
Mt +Bt + τ
l
t−1Pt−1wt−1lt−1 + P1t−1τ
N1
t−1N1t−1 + P2t−1τ
N2
t−1N2t−1 + τ
dPt−1dt−1 + τNKPt−1dNKt−1
= Mt−1 +Rt−1Bt−1 + Pt−1gt−1 +
[
(1− kh1t−1)s1t−1 + (1− kh2t−1)s2t−1
]
Pt−1κ
+Pt−1τa1t−1γ1a1t−1 + Pt−1τ
a2
t−1γ2a2t−1 + Pt−1(1− τ lt−1)wt−1lt−1, (24)
where gt denotes exogenous government expenditure in period t.
2.7 Private-Sector Equilibrium
Taking as given the exogenous processes {zt, gt, τ lt , µt, τN1t , τN2t , τa1t , τa2t }8, the decentralized search
equilibrium is a set of state-contingent functions for {x1t, x2t, lt, a1t, s1t, a2t, s2t, N1t+1, N2t+1, wt,
mct, p1t, p2t, Rt, pit,A1t,A2t, } that satisfy: the consumption-leisure optimality condition (6); the
Walrasian cash goods/credit goods optimality condition (7); the nominal bond Euler equation (8);
the cash shopping condition (9); the credit shopping condition (10); the New Keynesian Phillips
Curve (13); the cash advertising condition (18); the credit advertising condition (19); the aggregate
8Following much of the related literature, in all of our results we have also assumed a fixed subsidy τw which
offsets the steady-state markup created by imperfect competition in the model. None of our results depend on this
assumption.
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law of motion for cash relationships (20) and credit relationships (21); the Nash pricing condi-
tions (22) and (23); the government budget constraint (24); the binding CIA constraint (stated in
real terms)
x1t + (1 + τ
N1
t )p1tN1t
x1t−1 + (1 + τN1t−1)p1t−1N1t−1
=
µt
pit
, (25)
the definitions of the present-value to a firm, respectively, of a cash customer market relationship
A1t = p1t − 1 + (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
p1t+1 − 1 +
(1− τa1t+1)γ1
kf1t+1
]}
(26)
and a credit customer market relationship
A2t = p2t − 1 + (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
p2t+1 − 1 +
(1− τa2t+1)γ2
kf2t+1
]}
, (27)
and the aggregate goods resource constraint
x1t−1 + x2t−1 +N1t−1 +N2t−1 + gt−1 + γ1a1t−1 + γ2a2t−1 +
ϕ
2
(pit−1 − pi∗) = zt−1lt−1 (28)
The resource constraint is stated in period t − 1 terms because of the timing of markets in
the model — specifically, because (all) goods are paid for with a one period lag, summing the
time-t consumer and government budget constraints gives rise to the time-(t − 1) goods resource
constraint. 9
3 Exogenous Policy Estimation
3.1 Functional Forms and Calibration
The instantaneous utility over Walrasian cash and credit goods is
u(x1t, x2t) =
{[
(1− κx)xφx1t + κxxφx2t
] 1
φx
}1−σx
− 1
1− σx (29)
This CES aggregate of cash and credit goods nested inside CRRA utility is standard in cash/credit
goods models. We assume a symmetric utility function over non-Walrasian cash and credit goods,
v(N1t, N2t) =
{[
(1− κc)Nφc1t + κcNφc2t
] 1
φc
}1−σc
− 1
1− σc . (30)
Instantaneous utility over leisure is given by
h(lt + s1t + s2t) =
ζ
1 + 1ν
(s1t + s2t + lt)
1+ 1
ν . (31)
9This specification is exactly the same as in Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari and Kehoe (1999). We note a
technical issue this timing imposes on the formulation of the Ramsey problem below.
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We use standard functional forms to search in matching in the economy. The matching function
is Cobb-Douglas,
mi(si, ai) = ψis
ξs
i a
1−ξs
i , i = 1, 2. (32)
Define market tightness in market i as θi =
ai
si
. Then
khi =
mi(si, ai)
si
= mi(1, θi) = θik
f
i . (33)
3.2 Estimation Results
Given the above equilibrium conditions, we proceed to estimate the model using Bayesian methods.
We assume that technology, government and spending follow exogenous AR(1) processes in logs:
log zt = ρz log zt−1 + zt , (34)
log(gt/g¯) = ρg log(gt−1/g¯) + 
g
t (35)
log(τ lt/τ¯
l) = ρτ l log(τ
l
t−1/τ¯
l) + τ
l
t . (36)
In our empirical implementation of the model, we also assume that the remaining taxes τN1t =
τN2t = τ
a1
t = τ
a2
t = τ
w
t = 0 for all t.
Given the emphasis of contemporary monetary policy on the nominal interest rate, we further
assume that Rt is specified according to a Taylor-type rule with interest rate smoothing, and that
money growth, µt, adjusts endogenously to implement that rate. Deviations from the Taylor rule
are captured by i.i.d. monetary shocks, Rt . Specifically,
log(Rt/R) = ρr log(Rt−1/R) + (1− ρr) [αpi log (pit/pi∗) + αy log (yt/y¯)] + Rt . (37)
The innovations jt , j = z, g, τ
l, R are distributed N(0, σ2
jt
) and are independent of each other. For
the estimation, we use data on Yt = [∆GDPt, pit, Rt,∆A
annual
t ]. The data are described in the
appendix. Since we have only annual data for advertising, we use an unbalanced panel, and a
version of the Kalman filter that accounts for missing observations.
Table 1 describes how well the estimated model fits with the dimensions of the data used for
estimation. Qualitatively, the model does a very good job at matching the unconditional moments
of the data. Volatilities and cross-correlations of the data are very closely matched. One exception
is the autocorrelation of output growth, which is lower in the model than in the data, perhaps
reflecting the fact that our priors do allow for the possibility of a random walk on the exogenous
processes.
Table 2 summarizes the prior and posterior distributions for the estimated parameters. Our
estimate of price stickiness is largely in line with previous estimates and calibrations. The in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution parameter σc = σx is estimated to be substantially greater
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∆y ∆aannual pi R
Data
Abs. volatility 0.86 4.44 0.55 0.69
Autocorr. 0.33 0.18 0.87 0.96
Corr. with GDP 1 0.23 -0.29 -0.13
Model
Abs. volatility 0.97 5.21 0.47 0.62
Autocorr. 0.04 0.06 0.76 0.91
Corr. with GDP 1 0.16 -0.10 -0.04
Table 1: Data vs. Model. Upper panel displays the empirical growth rate of GDP, annual growth rate of
advertising, inflation, and three-month interest rate. Bottom panel displays estimated model analogs.
than unity. The estimates for the parameters driving the exogenous processes are not surprising,
although the data imply that technology shocks are extremely persistent and account for a large
portion of the variance of output in the economy at longer frequencies.
The two estimated parameters that bear most on optimal policy are the Nash bargaining param-
eters and the value of the outside option κ. These two parameters govern congestion externalities in
customer markets. Just as in labor search and matching models, if these externalities do not cancel
out, prices and hence allocations are inefficient.10 While most parameters are well identified and
very precisely estimated, the confidence bounds on the Nash bargaining parameters are somewhat
large. However, the large value of κ is precisely estimated and substantially larger than our priors.
Because κ is not a primitive of the economy (it appears in neither household utility nor the resource
constraint), the estimated κ = 0.59 indicates a strong inefficiency in customer market pricing.
4 Optimal Policy
For the sake of comparison with the Ramsey optimal policy results, Table 3 presents standard
business-cycle comovements in the estimated model using both TFP shocks and government spend-
10This intuition follows from the well-known analysis of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) in labor-matching models.
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Median 5% 95%
ϕ 18.85 12.44 25.77
ρ 0.50 0.49 0.51
κ 0.59 0.40 0.72
η1 0.43 0.27 0.63
η2 0.46 0.29 0.66
σx = σc 2.72 2.34 3.14
σr 0.00 0.00 0.00
σz 0.01 0.01 0.02
σg 0.04 0.04 0.05
στ 0.08 0.06 0.10
ρr 0.76 0.73 0.80
ρz 0.99 0.98 0.99
ρg 0.93 0.91 0.95
ρτ 0.81 0.76 0.85
αpi 1.68 1.47 1.96
αy 0.01 0.00 0.02
Table 2: Estimated Parameters.
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ing shocks. In all subsequent tables, we compute the model moments based on many 100-period
simulations in which the realizations of the exogenous shocks hitting the economy are the same for
each table row. This ensures that any differences are due to differences in the economy and not
sampling errors.
With the baseline calibration established, we now discard the exogenous process (36) for the
labor income tax rate and the Taylor rule (37) and instead endogenize both income and customer
good tax policy.11 While taxes are now optimally chosen by a Ramsey government, government
purchases continue to follow the exogenous process (35), as does the exogenous productivity pro-
cess (34).12 Given the complexity of the model, we use the dual approach for the Ramsey analysis,
in which (as defined immediately below) all allocations and policy instruments are chosen subject
to all of the market equilibrium conditions.
4.1 Ramsey Problem
The Ramsey problem is to choose state-contingent processes
{x1t, x2t, lt, N1t+1, N2t+1, s1t, s2t, θ1t, θ2t,mct, p1t, p2t, Rt, τ lt , pit, bt, τN1t , τN2t , τa1t , τa2t ,A1t,A2t} to max-
imize lifetime household utility (1) subject to: the consumption-leisure optimality condition (6);
the Walrasian cash goods/credit goods optimality condition (7); the nominal bond Euler equa-
tion (8); the cash shopping condition (9); the credit shopping condition (10); the New Keynesian
Phillips Curve (13); the cash advertising condition (18); the credit advertising condition (19); the
aggregate law of motion for cash relationships (20) and credit relationships (21); the Nash pricing
conditions (22) and (23); the government budget constraint (24); the valuations to firms of cash
customer market and credit customer market customers (26) and (27); and the aggregate goods
resource constraint (28), taking as given exogenous productivity (34) and exogenous government
purchases (35).
4.2 Computational Issues
The first-order conditions of the Ramsey problem are assumed to be necessary and sufficient, and all
allocations are assumed to be interior. As is common in the Ramsey literature, when characterizing
asymptotic policy dynamics (that is, the dynamics of the Ramsey equilibrium implied by the
Ramsey t > 0 first-order conditions), we also make the auxiliary assumption that the initial state
of the economy is the asymptotic Ramsey steady state.
A technical issue that arises in the formulation of the Ramsey problem is the dating of the
11We also return to the case of zero lump-sum taxes, required for a Ramsey analysis.
12Thus, we follow the standard convention in Ramsey analysis that spending is exogenous but the revenue side of
fiscal policy is determined optimally.
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GDP a x N s θ1 θ2
Abs. volatility 2.42 8.39 2.12 1.96 4.44 12.43 12.93
Rel. vol. (wrt GDP) 1 3.47 0.88 0.81 1.84 5.15 5.35
Autocorr. 0.92 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.94
Corr. wrt GDP 1 0.71 0.58 0.58 -0.82 0.76 0.75
Table 3: Business Cycle Fluctuations. Simulated moments using the estimated exogenous policy model,
conditional on shocks to both productivity and government purchases.
Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint (or, stated equivalently, with the gov-
ernment flow budget constraint). Recall from the definition of equilibrium in Section 2.7 that it is
the time-(t − 1) resource constraint that is implied by the time-t consumer and government flow
budget constraints. Because the assumed timing of our model is that the Ramsey planner observes
gt and zt before determining time-t allocations and policies, the multiplier associated with the
resource constraint is dated t − 1 — in other words, terms in the Ramsey first-order conditions
arising from the time-t resource constraint carry a multiplier dated t . This formulation of course
sounds natural, but we simply mean to point out that because of the assumed timing of markets
(namely, asset markets preceding goods and labor markets), care must be taken in writing the
Ramsey problem.
4.3 Results
Table 4 presents several long-run and short-run aspects of the Ramsey results. As the bottom
panel shows, all five of the fiscal instruments (which are part of the complete set of instruments)
are non-zero in the steady state, and the Friedman Rule of a zero net nominal interest rate is
achieved.13 The differences between the pair τa1 and τa2 and the pair τa1 and τa2 is due to the
differently estimated pricing inefficiencies across the cash customer market and the credit customer
market captured in the different customer Nash bargaining powers η1 = 0.43 and η2 = 0.46 (as
seen in Table 2), which is part of what generates congestion externalities in customer pricing.
Comparing the dynamics between Table 3 and Table 4, the volatilities of the Ramsey-optimal
customer markets allocations θ1, θ2, a(≡ a1 + a2), and s(≡ s1 + s2) are lower than in the estimated
exogenous-policy model — between 50 percent lower (for a) and 80 percent lower (for s). The
reason for this is that the Ramsey government with a complete set of policy tools is able to
13As described in Section 2, all profits (dividends) received lump-sum by households are taxed at a 100-percent
rate, hence the nominal interest rate plays no role in taxing them.
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GDP a x N s θ1 θ2
Abs. volatility 2.28 4.29 2.11 1.96 0.74 4.38 4.38
Rel. vol. (wrt GDP) 1 1.88 0.92 0.86 0.33 1.92 1.92
Auto. corr. 0.92 0.86 0.93 0.93 0.20 0.94 0.94
Corr. with GDP 1 0.63 0.60 0.60 -0.50 0.70 0.70
Long-run pi 0.9924
Long-run τ l 0.1872
Long-run τa1 0.0398
Long-run τa2 0.2293
Long-run τN1 -0.4858
Long-run τN2 -0.4668
Long-run R− 1 0
Table 4: Optimal Policy Allocations. Conditional on the estimated parameters, the upper panel shows
Ramsey-optimal dynamics, the lower panel shows long-run Ramsey policy. Shocks are to productivity and
government purchases.
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offset the congestion externalities that affect pricing in customer markets, which in turn leads
to smaller fluctuations in customer markets. An important point that emerges from this is that
empirically-observed fluctuations in advertising are inefficient. In term of business cycle volatilities
and comovements of other aggregates — namely, GDP and consumption, which in our framework
itself is broken into Walrasian consumption x(≡ x1 + x2) and customer goods consumption N(≡
N1 +N2) — are quite similar across the exogenous policy equilibrium and the Ramsey equilibrium.
In Table 5, the (upper) sticky-price panel and the (middle) flexible-price panel allows for com-
parison to the existing Ramsey literature. Focusing first just on the first three columns (inflation
pi, the nominal interest rate R, and the labor income tax τ l), comparison of row one and row four
shows that the fluctuations in these instruments reproduce those in, respectively, Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe (2004) and CCK (1991). The intuition for these results is exactly as in these previ-
ous studies – with perfectly flexible nominal prices, inflation volatility acts as a shock absorber for
nominal government bond payments, but for empirically-relevant nominal price rigidities, the shock
absorber role is dominated by keeping pricing distortions in Walrasian markets to a minimum.
In terms of the new tax instruments (the fourth through sixth columns of Table 5), line one
and line four show that the subsidies for advertising costs display similar volatilities. However, the
taxes τN1 and τN2 imposed on customer market purchases are two orders of magnitude larger in
the sticky-price case. From the perspective of a Social Planning problem, all of these taxes offset
congestion in customer market pricing.
4.4 Optimal Policy with Limited Tax Instruments
The set of taxes that forms the complete set helps us to understand the model both in the positive
and normative sense. However, several of these taxes (τa1 , τa2 , τN1 , and τN2) are difficult to map
to observable policy, especially at business cycle frequencies. Hence, they were not included in the
estimated version of the model, but introduced into the optimal policy problem as instruments for
diagnostic purposes. In this section, we restrict the Ramsey planner to the same set of (incom-
plete) tax instruments — labor income taxes, nominal interest rates, and inflation — as was used
in the estimation and examine optimal policy dynamics. Given the incompleteness, congestion
externalities cannot be fully offset.
The second and fifth rows of Table 5 present results on policy volatility with incomplete tax
instruments. Most striking is the large volatility of the labor income tax, regardless of sticky or
flexible nominal prices. Labor tax volatility is acting as an imperfect proxy for the instruments
(τa1 , τa2 , τN1 , and τN2) that directly affect customer market outcomes. In terms of the nominal
interest rate, it fluctuates somewhat in both the flex-price and sticky-price cases, suggesting that
monetary policy plays a somewhat greater role in stabilizing price distortions in customer markets
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Parameter Set pit Rt τ
l
t τ
N1
t τ
N2
t τ
a1
t τ
a2
t
Ramsey with sticky prices
Complete taxes 0.00 0.04 0.21 425.5 581.3 43.7 6.58
Incomplete taxes 0.00 0.10 1.74 — — — —
Incomp. taxes + no search 0.00 0.06 0.52 — — — —
Ramsey with flexible prices
Complete taxes 6.95 0 0 0.92 0.97 48.5 7.05
Incomp. taxes 9.47 0.05 1.41 — — — —
Estimated Exog. Model 0.06 0.08 — — — — —
Table 5: Volatilities of policy instruments in several Ramsey equilibria. The incomplete system
of taxes excludes τa1 , τa2 , τN1 , and τN2 . In the exogenous policy case (line 6), labor tax rate shocks are set
to zero. Volatility of all instruments reported as coefficient of variation relative to that of GDP. Shocks are
to TFP and government purchases.
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when the tax system is incomplete.
4.5 Impulse Responses
To explain further the nature of policy and allocations, we consider several impulse responses.
Figure 2 shows impulse responses of search allocations to a technology shock in four different
versions of the model. The starred blue line shows that the exogenous policy model generates the
largest movements in search activity, both for households as well as for firms’ advertising behavior
which, together, translate into large movements in product market tightness. The Ramsey optimal
policy with the complete set of tax instruments significantly reduces the magnitude of the impulse
responses relative to the exogenous policy model, regardless of whether or not nominal rigidities
are present, as shown by the dashed red and solid black lines, respectively. The green line shows
that when the set of tax instruments is restricted as in Section 4.4, the Ramsey planner can only
partially stabilize congestion externalities in customer markets relative to the outcome in which
the full set of instruments is available.14
Figure 3 plots the impulse response of the consumption variables x1, x2, N1, and N2 to a
technology shock. While the allocations for the customer goods do not depend on the presence of
sticky prices, there are small but non-trivial difference in the allocations of the Walrasian goods.
Figures 4 and 5 show the impulse responses of the observable tax rates (the nominal interest
rate, the labor income tax, and inflation) for a positive technology and government spending shock,
respectively. Under flexible prices, the nominal interest rate and the labor tax rate remain constant
at their steady-state values. In contrast, inflation is highly volatile reflecting the incentive to use
ex post inflation to generate tax revenue. With nominal rigidities, the optimal response of inflation
drops to nearly zero in all the other versions of the model. This is not surprising given the large
welfare costs of the relative price distortion. In general, the volatility of the interest rate and the
labor income tax is much higher in the model with an incomplete tax system. Comparing the
response of taxes in the model with an incomplete tax system both with and without customer
markets reveals that the presence of congestion frictions boosts the optimal volatility of both the
interest rate as well as the labor tax.
Finally, Figure 6 provides a convenient way to summarize all of these results. Each panel of
the figure presents the impulse response of one of the key wedges in our model, which the Ramsey
planner attempts to stabilize with her policy. What is common across all six panels is that wedge
movements in the exogenous policy model are large, as shown by the starred blue line. In the flexible
price economy with a complete set of tax instruments the Ramsey planner is able to completely
14We experimented with government spending shocks and found the same qualitative results. In order to save
space, we do not present these results, but they are available upon request.
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smooth all the wedges in the economy, as shown by the solid black line. In this special case, the
Ramsey planner achieves the same dynamics as would be preferred by the social planner. (See
Appendix H for a derivation of the social planner’s problem.) The socially efficient allocations by
construction internalize all congestion externalities in customer markets.
If nominal rigidities are present, the red dashed line shows that the Ramsey planner achieves
outcomes that are only a tiny distance on impact from the social planner’s outcomes, a difference
which furthermore decays extremely quickly after the initial period. Hence, nominal price rigidities
seem to have little effect on the ability of optimal policy to offset the externalities in the customer
markets pricing system, so long as the tax system is complete.
When policy is restricted to a limited set of tax instruments, the planner achieves outcomes that
generally lie in between the unconstrained Ramsey planner’s and the exogenous policy outcome.
The one exception to this is for the labor wedge (first wedge.) For this wedge, the planner does
worse than under optimal policy, indicating that indeed, the planner accepts otherwise subopti-
mal allocations along this dimension in order to use the labor tax as an instrument to mitigate
externalities in customer markets.
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Figure 2: Search Allocations. IRFs with respect to productivity shock.
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Figure 3: Macro Allocations. IRFs with respect to productivity shock.
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Figure 4: Taxes and TFP. Impulse responses to a government spending shock for the nominal interest
rate (first panel), labor income tax (second panel), and inflation (third panel) across several equilibria.
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Figure 5: Taxes and Government Spending. Impulse responses to a government spending shock for
the nominal interest rate (first panel), labor income tax (second panel), and inflation (third panel) across
several equilibria.
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Figure 6: Wedges. Impulse responses to a TFP shock for static wedges (first three panels), intertemporal
wedges (fourth and fifth panels), and inflation (sixth panel) across several equilibria.
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5 Conclusion
This paper estimates a model in which some fraction of goods exchange takes place in a search
and matching market. The estimation process uses advertising data to pin down key parameters
of the customer goods component of the model. The estimates imply strong congestion external-
ities in customer markets, which in turn reveal that empirically-observed advertising volatility is
inefficiently large.
In light of this, a main goal of optimal policy is to dampen the externalities in customer markets.
We show that if the set of instruments is constrained to a standard set of policy tools — inflation and
the labor tax — then labor taxes can play a role in dampening congestion externalities in customer
markets. With a complete set of tax instruments, the optimal policy mix calls for significant
volatility in fiscal instruments that operate directly on the customer search market — sales taxes
on customer market goods and/or advertising subsidies. Labor income taxes are constant over the
business cycle, which is a classic result in the optimal policy literature that consider a complete
system of taxes; however, if we consider an incomplete (but realistically observable) set of taxes,
labor income taxes are strikingly volatile regardless of whether nominal prices are flexible or sticky.
Whether nominal prices are flexible or sticky, the model gives very little role for monetary policy
in offsetting customer-market externalities.
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A Related Literature
Relationship-based interactions between consumers and firms have recently received increasing
attention in the business cycle literature.15 For example, Gourio and Rudanko (2013) study the
relationship between search frictions in the goods market, firm-level dynamics, and firms’ investment
decisions over the business cycle. Ravikumar and Shao (2010) analyze the link between goods search
frictions and the volatility of asset prices, and den Haan (2013) explores the connection between
goods search frictions, inventories, and business cycles. Perhaps more relevant to our work, Hall
(2008, 2013) studies the link between advertising, surplus sharing, and business cycles, highlighting
that search frictions in goods markets can play an important role in explaining particular short-
run and long-run macroeconomic outcomes in the data. In particular, Hall (2013) focuses on the
behavior of advertising and profit margins over the business cycle and analyzes how the role of
product-market and profit margin wedges can help us reconcile the cyclical movements in profit
margins with the fact that advertising is procyclical. The apparent relevance of these wedges
immediately raises questions about the role of optimal policy, and this is where our work makes
one relevant contribution.
Matha¨ and Pierrard (2011) build a business cycle model with search frictions a la Mortensen and
Pissarides in the goods markets and explore whether the presence of these frictions alongside shocks
to the product market improve the fit of the standard RBC model. In contrast to our setup, search
frictions are present for all goods in the economy and determine the interaction between customer
markets and Walrasian markets. While our model includes intermediate goods and final goods
firms, there are three key differences relative to Matha¨ and Pierrard’s work. First, we consider
search frictions between consumers of final goods and firms, as opposed to search frictions between
firms at different stages of production. Second, we allow for both customer goods and Walrasian
goods in the economy. Thus, we can explore the implications of varying the role of customer
goods in the economy for the conduct of optimal policy. Finally, our economic environment nests
a standard sticky price model, which allows us to readily analyze the importance of goods search
frictions relative to nominal rigidities in affecting optimal policy.
Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2012) study the business cycle consequences of having search
frictions in the capital, goods, and labor markets.16 The interaction between goods and labor
15This is not the only literature that has placed attention on search frictions in the goods market. For example,
some papers argue that these frictions can play an important role for firm entry and international trade, the cost
structure of firms and the evolution of market size in specific sectors (Arkolakis (2010); Lester (2010); Cannon and
Homburg (2001); Janssen and Non (2008)). The marketing literature has also explored how customers decide to
establish long-term relationships with particular firms to acquire goods and services, while choosing to have more
casual and indirect links with other rms through spot markets (Sheth and Shah (2003)).
16Using a model with labor market and goods market search frictions in general equilibrium, Duras (2013) uses
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market frictions establishes a novel propagation mechanism able to generate rich labor market
dynamics relative to models with Walrasian goods markets. Similar to our model, the economic
environment in Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer has two types of goods and only one of them is
subject to search frictions. Moreover, the friction in the goods market affects the interaction
between firms and consumers, where consumers must exert effort to find those goods subject to
search frictions. In our setup, the cost of searching for goods is a time cost as opposed to an
effort cost. This establishes a tradeoff between working and searching for goods that is absent in
Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer’s setup. Finally, our main focus is on the optimal policy implications
of search and matching frictions in the goods market. This is an issue that Petrosky-Nadeau and
Wasmer and the majority of the papers in the literature abstract from, and is one of the most
important contributions of our work.
Bayesian techniques and explores whether the interaction of these two frictions can amplify productivity and demand
shocks. His findings are in line with those in Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2012): the interaction between these
frictions creates an amplification effect.
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B Household Optimization
The representative household maximizes expected lifetime utility
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βt [u(x1t, x2t) + ϑv(N1t, N2t)− h(lt + s1t + s2t)] (38)
subject to the sequence of flow budget constraints
Mt −Mt−1 +Bt −Rt−1Bt−1 = (1− τ lt−1)Pt−1wt−1lt−1 − Pt−1x1t−1
−Pt−1x2t−1 − P1t−1(1 + τN1t−1)N1t−1
−P2t−1(1 + τN2t−1)N2t−1 + (1− τd)dt−1
+
[
(1− kh1t−1)s1t−1 + (1− kh2t−1)s2t−1
]
Pt−1κ, (39)
cash-in-advance constraints
Ptx1t + P1t
(
1 + τN1t
)
N1t ≤Mt, (40)
and perceived laws of motion for its cash customer relationships and credit customer relationships
N1t+1 = (1− ρ)(N1t + s1tkh1t) (41)
and
N2t+1 = (1− ρ)(N2t + s2tkh2t). (42)
Customer goods incur the sales tax rate τN1t and τ
N2
t , and labor income is taxed at the rate τ
l
t .
Each unmatched shopper, whether a cash shopper or a credit shopper, receives a “coupon” κ from
the government.17 Finally, Pt denotes the period-t nominal price of any Walrasian good (cash
or credit), P1t denotes the period-t nominal price of a cash customer good, and P2t denotes the
period-t nominal price of credit customer good.
Denote by {φt/Pt−1}, {λt/Pt}, {µh1t}, and {µh2t} the sequences of Lagrange multipliers on the
sequences of these four constraints, respectively. The first-order conditions with respect to x1t, x2t
lt, s1t, s2t, N1t+1, N2t+1, Mt, and Bt are, respectively,
ux1(x1t, x2t)− λt − βEtφt+1 = 0, (43)
ux2(x1t, x2t)− βEtφt+1 = 0, (44)
−h′(lt + st) + (1− τ lt )(1 + τwt )wtβEtφt+1 = 0, (45)
−h′(lt + st) + (1− kh1t)κβEtφt+1 + (1− ρ)µh1tkh1t = 0, (46)
17The coupon κ could be interpreted in different ways. In this paper, we interpret them as government-provided
income.
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−h′(lt + st) + (1− kh2t)κβEtφt+1 + (1− ρ)µh2tkh2t = 0, (47)
−µh1t + βEt {ϑvN1(N1t+1, N2t+1)} − βEt
{
λt+1
P1t+1
Pt+1
(
1 + τN1t+1
)}
− βEt
{
βφt+2
P1t+1
Pt+1
(1 + τN1t+1)
}
+ β(1− ρ)Etµh1t+1 = 0,
(48)
−µh2t + βEt {ϑvN2(N1t+1, N2t+1)} − βEt
{
βφt+2
P2t+1
Pt+1
(1 + τN2t+1)
}
+ β(1− ρ)Etµh2t+1 = 0, (49)
− φt
Pt−1
+
λt
Pt
+ βEt
(
φt+1
Pt
)
= 0, (50)
and
− φt
Pt−1
+ βRtEt
(
φt+1
Pt
)
= 0. (51)
As in Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari and Kehoe (1999) and others that follow the same
cash/credit setup, a standard Walrasian credit consumption-labor optimality condition arises,
h′(lt + st)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
= (1− τ lt )(1 + τwt )wt (52)
(use conditions (44) and (45) to see this), a standard (Walrasian) cash-good/credit-good optimality
condition arises,
ux1(x1t, x2t)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
= Rt, (53)
and the pricing condition for the one-period nominally risk-free government bond
1 = RtEt
[
βux1(x1t+1, x2t+1)
ux1(x1t, x2t)
1
pit+1
]
, (54)
where pit ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inflation rate between periods t− 1 and t.
B.1 Shopping Conditions
We now proceed to obtain representations for, in turn, the credit shopping condition and the cash
shopping condition. From here on, define p1t ≡ P1t/Pt and p2t ≡ P2t/Pt as the relative prices of the
cash customer good and the credit customer good, respectively, and define Ξt+1|t ≡ βux2 (x1t+1,x2t+1)ux2 (x1t,x2t)
as the one-period-ahead stochastic discount factor of the household.
B.1.1 Credit Shopping Condition
From (47), we can isolate
(1− ρ)µh2t =
h′(lt + st)
kh2t
−
(
1− kh2t
kh2t
)
ux2(x1t, x2t)κ. (55)
To obtain this representation, we have used the first-order condition (44), ux2(x1t, x2t) = βEtφt+1,
and we will continue to do so in everything that follows.
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Next, substituting this expression into (49),
h′(lt + st)
kh2t
−
(
1− kh2t
kh2t
)
ux2(x1t, x2t)κ
= (1− ρ)βEt
{
ϑvN2(N1t+1, N2t+1)− ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)(1 + τN2t+1)p2t+1
}
+ (1− ρ)βEt
{
h′(lt+1 + st+1)
kh2t+1
−
(
1− kh2t+1
kh2t+1
)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)κ
}
. (56)
Dividing by ux2(x1t, x2t) and using the notation defined above, Ξt+1|t ≡ βux2 (x1t+1,x2t+1)ux2 (x1t,x2t) ,
h′(lt + st)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
1
kh2t
−
(
1− kh2t
kh2t
)
κ
= (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
ϑvN2(N1t+1, N2t+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
− (1 + τN2t+1)p2t+1 +
h′(lt+1 + st+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
1
kh2t+1
−
(
1− kh2t+1
kh2t+1
)
κ
]}
,
(57)
which is a representation of the credit shopping condition condition that is useful for the credit-
relationship Nash bargaining problem below because it is recursive in the term
h′(lt + st)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
1
kh2t
−
(
1− kh2t
kh2t
)
κ. (58)
B.1.2 Cash Shopping Condition
For the cash shopping condition, start by proceeding similarly: from (46), we can isolate
(1− ρ)µh1t =
h′(lt + st)
kh1t
−
(
1− kh1t
kh1t
)
ux2(x1t, x2t)κ. (59)
Next, substituting this expression into (48),
h′(lt + st)
kh1t
−
(
1− kh1t
kh1t
)
ux2(x1t, x2t)κ
= (1− ρ)βEt
{
ϑvN1(N1t+1, N2t+1)− p1t+1
(
1 + τN1t+1
)
[βφt+2 + λt+1]
}
+ (1− ρ)βEt
{
h′(lt+1 + st+1)
kh1t+1
−
(
1− kh1t+1
kh1t+1
)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)κ
}
. (60)
Use (43) (and the law of iterated expectations) to substitute into the second line, which gives
h′(lt + st)
kh1t
−
(
1− kh1t
kh1t
)
ux2(x1t, x2t)κ
= (1− ρ)βEt
{
ϑvN1(N1t+1, N2t+1)− p1t+1
(
1 + τN1t+1
)
ux1(x1t+1, x2t+1)
}
+ (1− ρ)βEt
{
h′(lt+1 + st+1)
kh1t+1
−
(
1− kh1t+1
kh1t+1
)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)κ
}
. (61)
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Next, divide this expression by ux2(x1t, x2t), which yields
h′(lt + st)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
1
kh1t
−
(
1− kh1t
kh1t
)
· κ
= (1− ρ)βEt
{
ϑvN1(N1t+1, N2t+1)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
− p1t+1
(
1 + τN1t+1
) ux1(x1t+1, x2t+1)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
}
+ (1− ρ)βEt
{
h′(lt+1 + st+1)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
1
kh1t+1
−
(
1− kh1t+1
kh1t+1
)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
· κ
}
. (62)
Multiply and divide the second line and third line above by ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1), which gives
h′(lt + st)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
1
kh1t
−
(
1− kh1t
kh1t
)
· κ
= (1− ρ)βEt
{
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
ϑvN1(N1t+1, N2t+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
− p1t+1
(
1 + τN1t+1
) ux1(x1t+1, x2t+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
}
+ (1− ρ)βEt
{
h′(lt+1 + st+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
1
kh1t+1
−
(
1− kh1t+1
kh1t+1
)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
· κ
}
. (63)
Collecting terms,
h′(lt + st)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
1
kh1t
−
(
1− kh1t
kh1t
)
· κ
= (1− ρ)Et
{
βux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
[
ϑvN1(N1t+1, N2t+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
− p1t+1
(
1 + τN1t+1
) ux1(x1t+1, x2t+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
]}
+ (1− ρ)Et
{
βux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
[
h′(lt+1 + st+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
1
kh1t+1
−
(
1− kh1t+1
kh1t+1
)
κ
]}
.
(64)
Finally, use the notation Ξt+1|t, and also note that we can substitute Rt+1 on the right-hand side.
Thus, the cash shopping condition is
h′(lt + st)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
1
kh1t
−
(
1− kh1t
kh1t
)
κ
= (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
ϑvN1(N1t+1, N2t+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
− p1t+1Rt+1
(
1 + τN1t+1
)
+
h′(lt+1 + st+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
1
kh1t+1
−
(
1− kh1t+1
kh1t+1
)
κ
]}
,
(65)
and this particular representation is useful for the cash-relationship Nash bargaining problem below
because it is recursive in the term
h′(lt + st)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
1
kh1t
−
(
1− kh1t
kh1t
)
κ. (66)
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B.1.3 Envelope Conditions
For the Nash bargaining problems below, define the value function associated with the household
problem as V(N1t, N2t). The associated period-t envelope conditions are thus
VN1(N1t, N2t) = ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)− p1t
(
1 + τN1t
)
[βEtφt+1 + λt] + (1− ρ)µh1t
= ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)− ux1(x1t, x2t)p1t
(
1 + τN1t
)
+
h′(lt + st)
kh1t
−
(
1− kh1t
kh1t
)
ux2(x1t, x2t)κ
(67)
for the cash non-Walrasian good, in which the second line follows from (59); and for the credit
non-Walrasian good,
VN2(N1t, N2t) = ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)− (1 + τN2t )p2tβEtφt+1 + (1− ρ)µh2t
= ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)− ux2(x1t, x2t)(1 + τN2t )p2t +
h′(lt + st)
kh2t
−
(
1− kh2t
kh2t
)
ux2(x1t, x2t)κ
(68)
in which the second line follows from (55). For use in the Nash bargaining problems below, the
period t+ 1 envelope conditions can be expressed in discounted terms, respectively, as
Ξt+1|t
VN1(N1t+1, N2t+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
= Ξt+1|t
[
ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
− p1t+1Rt+1
(
1 + τN1t+1
)
+
h′(lt+1 + st+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
1
kh1t+1
−
(
1− kh1t+1
kh1t+1
)
κ
]
(69)
and
Ξt+1|t
VN2(N1t+1, N2t+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
= Ξt+1|t
[
ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
− (1 + τN2t+1)p2t+1 +
h′(lt+1 + st+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
1
kh2t+1
−
(
1− kh2t+1
kh2t+1
)
κ
]
.
(70)
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C Firm Optimization
C.1 Final Goods Firms
Final goods that are sold to households, through either Walrasian markets or non-Walrasian search
and matching markets, are produced via Dixit-Stiglitz bundling of intermediate goods. The price
elasticity of demand for each of the intermediate goods is ε, and thus the elasticity of demand across
intermediate producers will be ε−1ε . As is well-known, the equilibrium markup for Walrasian-market
final goods will be εε−1 . However, the equilibrium markup for search-and-matching final goods will
also depend on the bargaining power of customers versus firms, as well as on tax rates.
C.1.1 Walrasian Final Goods Firms
Each Walrasian final goods firm j produces output according to the CES production function
Xj,t =
(∫
x
ε−1
ε
i,t di
) ε
ε−1
, (71)
in which xi,t represents units of intermediate good i used in the production of Walrasian goods.
18 In
symmetric equilibrium, each firm j sells its output in a competitive market, so that Xj,t = Xj′,t =
Xt, for j 6= j′. Cost minimization implies that
xi,t =
(
pi,t
Pt
)−ε
Xt, (72)
where Pt is the price of a unit of the Walrasian good Xt.
C.1.2 Customer Market Firms
Each final goods firm j in the search sector produces according to the CES technology. Its output
is given by
Cj,t =
(∫
c
ε−1
ε
i,t di
) ε
ε−1
, (73)
in which ci,t represents the quantity of intermediate good i used in the production of customer
goods. In symmetric equilibrium, each search firm j produces Cj,t = Cj′,t = Ct, for all j 6= j′. Cost
minimization again implies that
ci,t =
(
pi,t
Pt
)−ε
Ct, (74)
in which Pt is the price of the Walrasian good used to produce (excluding search-and-matching
related costs) a unit of the customer good. This can equivalently be thought about as the marginal
cost mct of producing a unit of the customer good.
19
18Note that x, p, and X are chosen to describe the firm-level problems in this section. Thus, for example, pj,t
denotes the nominal price chosen by final goods producer j; it does not denote the Nash-bargained prices p1t or p2t.
19When we later impose symmetric equilibrium and normalize by nominal Pt, we will have Pt = mct = 1.
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Each customer match in which the customer and firm agree to a price and hence trade (whether
a cash customer or a credit customer) yields one unit of consumption/output, so that C1t = N1t
(for cash customers) and C2t = N2t (for credit customers). Thus, the representative search firm
maximizes
max
N1t+1,N2t+1,a1t,a2t
E0
∞∑
t=0
Ξt|0 [(p1t − 1)N1t + (p2t − 1)N2t − (1− τa1t )γ1a1t − (1− τa2t )γ2a2t] (75)
subject to perceived laws of motion
N1t+1 = (1− ρ)(N1t + kf1ta1t) (76)
and
N2t+1 = (1− ρ)(N2t + kf2ta2t). (77)
The nominal price for a search cash (credit) good is P1t (P2t), k
f
1t (k
f
2t) is the probability of a
given advertisement yielding a cash (credit) match, a1t (a2t) is advertising to attract cash (credit)
matches, and γ1 (γ2) parameterizes the cost of cash (credit) advertising.
Defining µf1t and µ
f
2t as the Lagrange multipliers with respect to the evolution of its cash
customer base and its credit customer base, the first-order conditions with respect to a1t, a2t,
N1t+1, and N2t+1, respectively, are
−(1− τa1t )γ1 + µf1t(1− ρ)kf1t = 0, (78)
−(1− τa2t )γ2 + µf2t(1− ρ)kf2t = 0, (79)
−µf1t + Et
{
Ξt+1|t
(
p1t+1 − 1 + (1− ρ)µf1t+1
)}
= 0, (80)
and
−µf2t + Et
{
Ξt+1|t
(
p2t+1 − 1 + (1− ρ)µf2t+1
)}
= 0. (81)
Conditions (78) and (80) give the firm’s optimal advertising condition for cash matches
(1− τa1t )γ1
kf1t
= (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
(
p1t+1 − 1 +
(1− τa1t+1)γ1
kf1t+1
)}
, (82)
while (79) and (81) gives the firm’s optimal advertising condition for credit matches
(1− τa2t )γ2
kf2t
= (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
(
p2t+1 − 1 +
(1− τa2t+1)γ2
kf2t+1
)}
. (83)
Note that a firm’s allocation of total advertising across cash and credit markets is described by
Et
{
Ξt+1|t
(
p1t+1 − 1 + (1−τ
a1
t+1)γ1
kf1t+1
)}
Et
{
Ξt+1|t
(
p2t+1 − 1 + (1−τ
a2
t+1)γ2
kf2t+1
)} = kf2t
kf1t
· γ1
γ2
· 1− τ
a1
t
1− τa2t
, (84)
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which depends on θ1t/θ2t.
For the Nash bargaining problems below, define the value function (denoted in Walrasian goods)
associated with the firm problem as F(N1t, N2t). The associated period-t envelope conditions are
thus
FN1(N1t, N2t) = p1t − 1 + (1− ρ)µf1t
= p1t − 1 + (1− τ
a1
t )γ1
kf1t
, (85)
for cash customer good, in which the second line follows from (78); and for the credit customer
good,
FN2(N1t, N2t) = p2t − 1 + (1− ρ)µf2t
= p2t − 1 + (1− τ
a2
t )γ2
kf2t
, , (86)
in which the second line follows from (79).
Finally, for use in the Nash bargaining problem below, the period t+ 1 envelope conditions can
be expressed in discounted terms, respectively, as
Ξt+1|tFN1(N1t, N2t) = Ξt+1|t
[
p1t+1 − 1 +
(1− τa1t+1)γ1
kf1t+1
]
(87)
and
Ξt+1|tFN2(N1t, N2t) = Ξt+1|t
[
p2t+1 − 1 +
(1− τa2t+1)γ2
kf2t+1
]
. (88)
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D Nash-Bargained Prices
D.1 Value Equations for Household
An individual who did not find a match at which to purchase goods in period t [receives “coupons”
κ] has value (measured in terms of Walrasian goods) to the household
St = κ. (89)
There is zero continuation payoff to the household of an unmatched shopper because the household
re-optimizes searching for goods at the start of period t + 1, and st is not a state variable for the
household at the start of period t+ 1. Thus, the trivial “envelope condition” with respect to st is
simply the outside payoff κ.
D.1.1 Credit Matches
An individual who is a credit customer (whether a first-time customer or a long-time customer)
in period t has value (measured in terms of Walrasian goods) to the household
M2t =
ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
− (1 + τN2t )p2t + (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
VN2(N1t+1, N2t+1)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
}
. (90)
The payoffs are utility net of the after-tax bargained payment, in addition to the marginal value
to the household of entering period t + 1 with another pre-existing credit customer relationship,
which is measured by the household-level envelope condition.
The surplus from purchasing via credit at a firm is thus
M2t − St = ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
− (1 + τN2t )p2t − κ+ (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
VN2(N1t+1, N2t+1)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
}
=
ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
− (1 + τN2t )p2t − κ+ (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
ϑvN2(N1t+1, N2t+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
− (1 + τN2t+1)p2t+1
]}
+ (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
h′(lt+1 + st+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
1
kh2t+1
−
(
1− kh2t+1
kh2t+1
)
κ
]}
, (91)
in which the second line makes use of the envelope condition (70). Comparing (91) to condition (70),
it is clear that
M2t − St = h
′(lt + st)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
1
kh2t
−
(
1− kh2t
kh2t
)
κ. (92)
The surplus earned by the household of successfully completing a purchase of credit customer
goods can finally be expressed as
M2t − St = ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
− (1 + τN2t )p2t − κ+ (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t (M2t+1 − St+1)
}
. (93)
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D.1.2 Cash Matches
An individual who is a cash customer (whether a first-time customer or a long-time customer) in
period t has value (measured in terms of Walrasian goods) to the household
M1t =
ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
− p1tRt(1 + τN1t ) + (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
VN1(N1t+1, N2t+1)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
}
. (94)
The payoffs are utility net of the bargained payment, which is affected by the nominal interest rate
R, in addition to the marginal value to the household of entering period t + 1 with another pre-
existing cash customer relationship, which is measured by the household-level envelope condition.
The surplus from purchasing via cash at a store is thus
M1t − St = ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
− p1tRt(1 + τN1t )− κ+ (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
VN1(N1t+1, N2t+1)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
}
=
ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
− p1tRt(1 + τN1t )− κ+ (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
ϑvN1(N1t+1, N2t+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
− p2t+1Rt+1
]}
+ (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
h′(lt+1 + st+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
1
kh1t+1
−
(
1− kh1t+1
kh1t+1
)
κ
]}
, (95)
in which the second line makes use of the envelope condition (69). Comparing (95) to condition (69),
it is clear that
M1t − St = h
′(lt + st)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
1
kh1t
−
(
1− kh1t
kh1t
)
κ. (96)
The surplus earned by the household of successfully completing a purchase of credit customer
goods can finally be expressed as
M1t − St = ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
− p1tRt(1 + τN1t )− κ+ (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t (M1t+1 − St+1)
}
. (97)
D.2 Value Equations for Customer Market Firms
Any posted advertisement that does not end up attracting a customer has zero value. The value
(denominated in Walrasian goods) to the firm of individuals who are purchasing (whether a first-
time customer or a long-time customer) via cash is
A1t = p1t − 1 + (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|tFN1(N1t+1, N2t+1)
}
= p1t − 1 + (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
p1t+1 − 1 +
(1− τa1t+1)γ1
kf1t+1
]}
, (98)
in which the second line makes use of the envelope condition (87); and the value to the firm of
individuals who are purchasing via credit is
A2t = p2t − 1 + (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|tFN2(N1t+1, N2t+1)
}
= p2t − 1 + (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
p2t+1 − 1 +
(1− τa2t+1)γ2
kf2t+1
]}
, (99)
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Because unmatched advertisements have zero value, the surplus to the firm is simply A1t for cash
customers and A2t for credit customers. For use in the Nash bargaining problems, note that
γ1(1−τa1t )
kf1t
= (1 − ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|tA1t+1
}
and
γ2(1−τa2t )
kf2t
= (1 − ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|tA2t+1
}
, which can be seen
from the firm analysis above.
D.3 Nash Bargaining
The firm bargains individually with each of its customers, whether a new customer, a long-time
customer, a cash customer, or a credit customer, in every period. For every customer, the firm and
the shopper choose the price that maximizes the generalized Nash product
(Mit − St)ηi A1−ηiit , (100)
in which ηi ∈ (0, 1) measures the bargaining power of the customer and i ∈ {1, 2} denotes cash
customers or credit customers.
The first-order condition of (100) with respect to the period-t price is
ηi (Mit − St)ηi−1 A1−ηiit
(
∂Mit
∂pit
− ∂St
∂pit
)
+ (1− ηi) (Mit − St)ηi A−ηiit
∂Ait
∂pit
= 0. (101)
To simplify, multiply by Aηiit , and also multiply by (Mit − St)1−ηi , which gives
ηiAit
(
∂Mit
∂pit
− ∂St
∂pit
)
+ (1− ηi) (Mit − St) ∂Ait
∂pit
= 0. (102)
It is clear from the value equations above that the marginals are ∂Ait∂pit = 1,
∂St
∂pit
= 0, and
∂M1t
∂p1t
= −Rt(1 + τN1t ) and ∂M2t∂p2t = −(1 + τ
N2
t ).
Substituting these, the first-order condition for cash-good bargaining simplifies to
M1t − St
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
=
η1
1− η1A1t, (103)
and for credit-good bargaining to
M2t − St
1 + τN2t
=
η2
1− η2A2t, (104)
which is the usual Nash sharing rule, here with either the nominal interest rate — expression (103)
— or proportional taxes — expression (104) — on relationship goods taken into consideration when
prices are determined.
Now proceed to derive explicit expressions for p1t and p2t.
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D.3.1 Nash Cash Pricing
Inserting the expression for M1t − St into the Nash sharing rule (103),
ϑvN1 (N1t,N2t)
ux2 (x1t,x2t)
− p1tRt(1 + τN1t )− κ+ (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t (M1t+1 − St+1)
}
Rt
=
η1
1− η1A1t; (105)
rewriting this slightly,(
ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
)
− p1t + 1− ρ
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
Et
{
Ξt+1|t (M1t+1 − St+1)
}
=
η1
1− η1A1t.
(106)
Next, use the time-t+ 1 Nash sharing rule to get(
ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
)
−p1t+ 1− ρ
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
Et
{
Ξt+1|tRt+1(1 + τ
N1
t+1)
η1
1− η1A1t+1
}
=
η1
1− η1A1t.
(107)
Make the substitution A1t = p1t − 1 + γ1(1−τ
a1
t )
kf1t
, which yields(
ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
)
− p1t
+
1− ρ
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
Et
{
Ξt+1|tRt+1(1 + τ
N1
t+1)
η1
1− η1A1t+1
}
=
η1
1− η1
[
p1t − 1 + γ1(1− τ
a1
t )
kf1t
]
.(108)
Next, use the condition
γ1(1−τa1t )
kf1t
= (1−ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|tA1t+1
}
to substitute on the right-hand-side,
which gives (
ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
)
− p1t
+
1− ρ
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
Et
{
Ξt+1|tRt+1(1 + τ
N1
t+1)
η1
1− η1A1t+1
}
=
η1
1− η1 (p1t − 1) +
η1
1− η1 (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|tA1t+1
}
. (109)
Grouping terms involving A1t+1,(
ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
)
− p1t
+
η1
1− η1 (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
Rt+1(1 + τ
N1
t+1)
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
− 1
]
A1t+1
}
=
η1
1− η1 (p1t − 1) . (110)
Next, grouping terms involving p1t,
p1t
[
η1
1− η1 + 1
]
=
(
ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
)
+
η1
1− η1
+
η1
1− η1 (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
Rt+1(1 + τ
N1
t+1)
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
− 1
]
A1t+1
}
. (111)
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Multiplying by (1− η1),
p1t = (1− η1)
(
ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
)
+ η1
+ η1(1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
Rt+1(1 + τ
N1
t+1)
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
− 1
]
A1t+1
}
.
(112)
Separating the terms inside the Et operator
p1t = (1− η1)
(
ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
)
+ η1
+ η1(1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
(
Rt+1(1 + τ
N1
t+1)
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
)
A1t+1
}
− η1(1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|tA1t+1
}
.
(113)
Then, because
γ1(1−τa1t )
kf1t
= (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|tA1t+1
}
, rewrite as
p1t = (1− η1)
(
ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
)
+ η1
+ η1(1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
(
Rt+1(1 + τ
N1
t+1)
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
)
A1t+1
}
− η1γ1(1− τ
a1
t )
kf1t
.
(114)
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D.3.2 Nash Credit Pricing
Inserting the expression for M2t − St into the Nash sharing rule (104),
ϑvN2 (N1t,N2t)
ux2 (x1t,x2t)
− (1 + τN2t )p2t − κ+ (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t (M2t+1 − St+1)
}
1 + τN2t
=
η2
1− η2A2t; (115)
rewriting this slightly,(
ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
1 + τN2t
)
− p2t + 1− ρ
1 + τN2t
Et
{
Ξt+1|t (M2t+1 − St+1)
}
=
η2
1− η2A2t.
(116)
Next, use the time-t+ 1 Nash sharing rule to get(
ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
1 + τN2t
)
−p2t+ 1− ρ
1 + τN2t
Et
{
Ξt+1|t(1 + τ
N2
t+1)
η2
1− η2A2t+1
}
=
η2
1− η2A2t.
(117)
Make the substitution A2t = p2t − 1 + γ2(1−τ
a2
t )
kf2t
, which yields(
ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
1 + τN2t
)
− p2t
+
1− ρ
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
Et
{
Ξt+1|t(1 + τ
N2
t+1)
η2
1− η2A2t+1
}
=
η2
1− η2
[
p2t − 1 + γ2(1− τ
a2
t )
kf2t
]
. (118)
Next, use the condition
γ2(1−τa2t )
kf2t
= (1 − ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|tA2t+1
}
to substitute on the right-hand-side,
which gives (
ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
1 + τN2t
)
− p2t
+
1− ρ
1 + τN2t
Et
{
Ξt+1|t(1 + τ
N2
t+1)
η2
1− η2A2t+1
}
=
η2
1− η2 (p2t − 1) +
η2
1− η2 (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|tA2t+1
}
. (119)
Grouping terms involving A2t+1,(
ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
1 + τN2t
)
− p2t
+
η2
1− η2 (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
1 + τN2t+1
1 + τN2t
− 1
]
A2t+1
}
=
η2
1− η2 (p2t − 1) . (120)
Next, grouping terms involving p2t,
p2t
[
η2
1− η2 + 1
]
=
(
ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
1 + τN2t
)
+
η2
1− η2
+
η2
1− η2 (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
1 + τN2t+1
1 + τN2t
− 1
]
A2t+1
}
. (121)
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Multiplying by (1− η2),
p2t = (1− η2)
(
ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
1 + τN2t
)
+ η2
+ η2(1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
1 + τN2t+1
1 + τN2t
− 1
]
A2t+1
}
. (122)
Separating the terms inside the Et operator
p2t = (1− η2)
(
ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
1 + τN2t
)
+ η2
+ η2(1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
(
1 + τN2t+1
1 + τN2t
)
A2t+1
}
− η2(1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|tA2t+1
}
. (123)
Then, because
γ2(1−τa2t )
kf2t
= (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|tA2t+1
}
, rewrite as
p2t = (1− η2)
(
ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
1 + τN2t
)
+ η2
+ η2(1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
(
1 + τN2t+1
1 + τN2t
)
A2t+1
}
− η2γ2(1− τ
a2
t )
kf2t
. (124)
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E Definition of Equilibrium
Decentralized bargaining equilibrium are state-contingent functions for
{x1t, x2t, lt, a1t, s1t, a2t, s2t, N1t+1, N2t+1, wt,mct, p1t, p2t, Rt, pit,A1t,A2t, } that satisfy: the consumption-
labor optimality condition
h′(lt + st)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
= (1− τ lt )(1 + τwt )wt, (125)
the (Walrasian) cash-good/credit-good optimality condition
ux1(x1t, x2t)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
= Rt, (126)
the binding CIA constraint (stated in real terms)
x1t + (1 + τ
N1
t )p1tN1t
x1t−1 + (1 + τN1t−1)p1t−1N1t−1
=
µt
pit
, (127)
the pricing condition for the one-period nominally risk-free government bond
1 = RtEt
[
βux1(x1t+1, x2t+1)
ux1(x1t, x2t)
1
pit+1
]
, (128)
the optimal shopping condition for cash goods
h′(lt + st)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
=
(
1− kh1t
)
κ
+ kh1t(1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
ϑvN1(N1t+1, N2t+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
− p1t+1Rt+1(1 + τN1t+1) +
h′(lt+1 + st+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
1
kh1t+1
−
(
1− kh1t+1
kh1t+1
)
κ
]}
,
(129)
the optimal shopping condition for credit goods
h′(lt + st)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
=
(
1− kh2t
)
κ
+ kh2t(1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
ϑvN2(N1t+1, N2t+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
− (1 + τN2t+1)p2t+1 +
h′(lt+1 + st+1)
ux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
1
kh2t+1
−
(
1− kh2t+1
kh2t+1
)
κ
]}
,
(130)
the optimal advertising condition for cash goods
(1− τa1t )γ1
kf1t
= (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
(
p1t+1 − 1 +
(1− τa1t+1)γ1
kf1t+1
)}
, (131)
the optimal advertising condition for credit goods
(1− τa2t )γ2
kf2t
= (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
(
p2t+1 − 1 +
(1− τa2t+1)γ2
kf2t+1
)}
, (132)
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the Nash pricing condition for cash customer goods
p1t = (1− η1)
(
ϑvN1(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
)
+ η1
+ η1(1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
Rt+1(1 + τ
N1
t+1)
Rt(1 + τ
N1
t )
− 1
]
A1t+1
}
, (133)
the Nash pricing condition for credit customer goods
p2t = (1− η2)
(
ϑvN2(N1t, N2t)/ux2(x1t, x2t)− κ
1 + τN2t
)
+ η2
+ η2(1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
1 + τN2t+1
1 + τN2t
− 1
]
A2t+1
}
, (134)
, the value to a firm of individuals who are purchasing via cash
A1t = p1t − 1 + (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
p1t+1 − 1 +
(1− τa1t+1)γ1
kf1t+1
]}
, (135)
the value to a firm of individuals who are purchasing via credit
A2t = p2t − 1 + (1− ρ)Et
{
Ξt+1|t
[
p2t+1 − 1 +
(1− τa2t+1)γ2
kf2t+1
]}
, (136)
the aggregate law of motion for cash customer relationships
N1t+1 = (1− ρ) (N1t +m(s1t, a1t)) , (137)
the aggregate law of motion for credit customer relationships
N2t+1 = (1− ρ) (N2t +m(s2t, a2t)) , (138)
the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
0 = (1− ε+ εmct) ztlt − ϕ (pit − pi∗)pit + EtΞt+1|tϕ (pit+1 − pi∗)pit+1, (139)
with marginal cost defined as
mct =
wt
zt
, (140)
and the aggregate goods resource constraint
x1t−1 + x2t−1 +N1t−1 +N2t−1 + gt−1 + γ1a1t−1 + γ2a2t−1 +
ϕ
2
(pit−1 − pi∗) = zt−1lt−1 (141)
for given exogenous processes {zt, gt, τ lt , µt, τN1t , τN2t , τa1t , τa2t , τwt }. The resource constraint is stated
in period t − 1 terms because of the timing of markets in the model — specifically, because (all)
goods are paid for with a one period lag, summing the time-t consumer and government budget
constraints gives rise to the time-(t− 1) goods resource constraint.20
20This specification is exactly the same as in Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari and Kehoe (1999). We note a
technical issue this timing imposes on the formulation of the Ramsey problem below.
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F Details of Estimation
F.1 Computing Steady-State
Analytically computing the steady-state of the model is a non-trivial task. Here we summarize the
steps we take. Define Ψ = β(1−ρ)1−β(1−ρ) . Then, with a few simplifications, the stationary first-order
conditions of the model are
ζ (l + s)
1
ν
ux2
= (1− τ l)w (142)
R =
1− κx
κx
(
x1
x2
)φx−1
(143)
µ = pi∗
(
x1 + (1 + τ
N )p1N1
)
(144)
R =
pi∗
β
(145)
(1− τ l)w = (1− kh1 )κ+ kh1Ψ
[
ϑvN1
ux2
− p1R
(
1 + τN1
)]
(146)
(1− τ l)w = (1− kh2 )κ+ kh2Ψ
[
ϑvN2
ux2
− p2
(
1 + τN2
)]
(147)
(1− τa1)γ1 = kf1Ψ(p1 − 1) (148)
(1− τa2)γ2 = kf2Ψ(p2 − 1) (149)
p1 = (1− η1)
(
ϑvN1/ux2 − κ
R (1 + τN1)
)
+ η1 (150)
p2 = (1− η2)
(
ϑvN2/ux2 − κ
1 + τN2
)
+ η2 (151)
N1 =
1− ρ
ρ
a1k
f
1 (152)
N2 =
1− ρ
ρ
a2k
f
2 (153)
w =
ε− 1
ε(1− τw) (154)
l = x1 + x2 +N1 +N2 + g + γ1a1 + γ2a2 (155)
To compute the steady state, we fix the steady-state output shares Φg , ΦN1 =
N1
l , ΦN2 =
N2
l ,
Φa1 =
γ1a1
l , Φa2 =
γ2a2
1 . The residual share is government spending Φx =
x1+x2
l . We also fix k
f
1 , k
f
2 ,
and impose an arbitrary normalization on steady-state hours. Combined, these eight restrictions
pin down the fundamental parameters ψ1, ψ2, γ1, γ2, κc, ϑ, ζ, g.
Note that combining shares with the normalization for l immediately gives quantities for
n1, n2, γ1a1, and γ2a2. Combine equations (148) and (152) to get
p1 = 1 +
(1− τa1)γ1a1
Ψ
1− ρ
ρN1
. (156)
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Similarly, combining (149) and (153) yields
p2 = 1 +
(1− τa2)γ2a2
Ψ
1− ρ
ρN2
. (157)
Plugging the expression for p1 back into the (148) yields the result
γ1 =
Ψ(p1− 1)kf1
1− τa1 . (158)
Similarly,
γ2 =
Ψ(p2− 1)kf2
1− τa2 . (159)
From here, the quantities for a1, a2, s1, s2, θ1, θ2 follow directly.
Now use equation (150) to solve for
ϑvN1
uX2
=
p1 − η1
1− η1 R(1 + τ
N1) + κ. (160)
The corresponding expression for equation (151) is
ϑvN2
uX2
=
p2 − η2
1− η2 (1 + τ
N2) + κ. (161)
Combining equations (156), (160), and the steady-state shopping condition in (146) and rear-
ranging yields expressions for kh1 and k
h
2
kh1 =
(1− τl)w − κ
ΨR(p1 − 1) (1 + τN1) η11−η1 + (1−Ψ)κ
(162)
kh2 =
(1− τl)w − κ
Ψ(p2 − 1) (1 + τN2) η21−η2 + (1−Ψ)κ
. (163)
From here, equation (143) can be used to back out the quantities of Walrasian goods,
x2 = Φxl
(1− κx)
1
φx−1
(κxR)
1
φx−1 + (1− κx)
1
φx−1
, (164)
and x1 = Φxl − x2.
To solve for κc, compute the ratio
vN1
vN2
using equations (160) and (161). It follows from the
function form of v(·) that
κc =
(
vN1
vN2
N1
N2
(1−φc)
+ 1
)−1
. (165)
Evaluating the derivative vN2 , equation (160) yields an expression for ϑ,
ϑ =
ux2
vN1
(
p1 − η1
1− η1 R(1 + τ
N1) + κ
)
. (166)
Finally, solve equation (142) to derive the implied value of ζ,
ζ = (1− τ l)wux2 (l + s)−
1
ν (167)
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F.2 Estimation
We can summarize the calibration of the exogenous-policy version of the model with the vector of
parameters, Ψ = {Ψ1,Ψ2}, where
Ψ1 = {β, pi∗, φx, φx, κx, ν, ε, , ξ,Φg,ΦN1 ,ΦN2 ,Φa1 ,Φa2 , kf1 , kf2 , l¯}
Ψ2 = {ϕ, ρ, κ, η1, η2, σx, σc, σr, σz, σg, στ l , ρr, ρz, ρg, ρτ l , αpi, αy}
The vector Ψ1 consists of parameters that we calibrate directly, either because they are pinned-
down by steady-state ratios or are known to be weakly identified by the dynamics of DSGE models.
After fixing Ψ1, we estimate the vector Ψ2 using Bayesan methods.
We set β = .9924, which implies an annual real interest rate of around 3.1 percent. We set
pi∗ = 1.0074 to correspond to an annual inflation rate of 3.0 percent. We set φx = 0.79, following
Siu (2004). Without reason to suppose that the cash-credit elasticities are different for customer
goods, we also fix φc = 0.79. Furthermore, we impose the restriction in estimation that σc = σx.
We set the Frisch elasticity of labor supply ν = 2, a standard number in calibrated models. We set
the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods firms to be ε = 5, which is also a standard
value in the New-Keynesian literature. We set ξ to be 0.5. The share of government expenditure
is Φg = .2. We set Φa1 = Φa2 = .01, to match the roughly two-percent share of advertising in
the macroeconomy. Experimentation suggests that, given the parameters Φa1 and Φa2 , the share
of advertising is not identified by the aggregate dynamics of the model. We therefore calibrate
the shares of relationship goods to be ΦN1 = ΦN1 = .19, so that their total share plus advertising
corresponds to half of consumption. We also normalize steady-state hours to be l¯ = 0.3. Finally,
given other parameters, the values of kf1 and k
f
2 also have no impact on the steady-state allocations
or dynamics in the economy (other than to rescale ai,t and the implied values for γi, keeping γiai,t
constant.) Therefore, we can fix them arbitrarily, and set kf1 = k
f
2 = 0.5.
Given the fixed parameters, we estimate the model using Bayesian methods on Yt =
[∆GDPt, pit, Rt,∆A
annual
t ] from 1966Q4 to 2010Q4, with an additional six years of burn-in to initial-
ize the Kalman filter. GDP growth is given by the growth in real per-capita GDP. Inflation is mea-
sured using the GDP deflator. The interest rate is given by the three month t-bill rate. And adver-
tising is drawn from the data provided by Douglas Galbi (http://purplemotes.net/2008/09/14/us-
advertising-expenditure-data/), collected in part by Robert Cohen, and extended by Hall (2013).
Figure 7 summarizes the prior and posterior density of our estimates.
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Figure 7: Prior and Posterior Distributions.
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G Ramsey Problem
The Ramsey problem is to choose state-contingent processes
{x1t, x2t, lt, N1t+1, N2t+1, s1t, s2t, θ1t, θ2t,mct, p1t, p2t, pit, bt, τN1t , τN2t , τa1t , τa2t } subject to
1. Aggregate resource constraint
2. Advertising condition for cash goods
3. Advertising condition for credit goods
4. Shopping condition for cash goods
5. Shopping condition for credit goods
6. Aggregate LOM for N1
7. Aggregate LOM for N2
8. Nash pricing equation for cash goods
9. Nash pricing equation for credit goods
10. New Keynesian Phillips Curve
11. Government flow budget constraint, which is
(
x1t + p1t(1 + τ
N1
t )N1t
)
pit + btpit + τ
l
t−1wt−1lt−1 + p1t−1τ
N1
t−1N1t−1
+ p2t−1τN2t−1N2t−1 + τ
ddt−1 + τNKdNKt−1
= x1t−1 + p1t−1(1 + τN1t−1)N1t−1 +Rt−1bt−1 + gt−1
+
[
(1− kh1t−1)s1t−1 + (1− kh2t−1)s2t−1
]
κ
+ τa1t−1γ1a1t−1 + τ
a2
t−1γ2a2t−1 + τ
w
t−1(1− τ lt−1)wt−1lt−1. (168)
A technical issue that arises in the formulation of the Ramsey problem is the dating of the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint (or, stated equivalently, with the gov-
ernment flow budget constraint). Recall from Appendix (E) that it is the time-(t − 1) resource
constraint that is implied by the time-t consumer and government flow budget constraints. Be-
cause the assumed timing of our model is that the Ramsey planner observes gt and zt before
determining time-t allocations and policies, the multiplier associated with the resource constraint
is dated t− 1 — in other words, terms in the Ramsey first-order conditions arising from the time-t
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resource constraint carry a multiplier dated t . This formulation of course sounds natural, but we
simply mean to point out that because of the assumed timing of markets (namely, asset markets
preceding goods and labor markets), care must be taken in writing the Ramsey problem.
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H Social Planner
The social planner seeks to maximize the lifetime utility of the representative household,
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βt [u(x1t, x2t) + ϑv(N1t, N2t)− h(lt + s1t + s2t)] (169)
(in which st ≡ s1t + s2t), subject to sequences of goods resource constraints
x1t + x2t +N1t +N2t + gt + γ1a1t + γ2a2t = ztlt, (170)
and laws of motion for cash-good relationships
N1t+1 = (1− ρ)(N1t +m(s1t, a1t)) (171)
and credit-good relationships
N2t+1 = (1− ρ)(N2t +m(s2t, a2t)). (172)
Denote by {φt}, {µ1t}, and {µ2t} the sequences of Lagrange multipliers on the sequences of these
three constraints, respectively.
The first-order conditions with respect to x1t, x2t, lt, s1t, a1t, s2t, a2t, N1t+1, and N2t+1 are,
respectively,
ux1(x1t, x2t)− φt = 0, (173)
ux2(x1t, x2t)− φt = 0, (174)
−h′(lt + st) + λtzt = 0, (175)
−h′(lt + st) + (1− ρ)µ1t ·ms(s1t, a1t) = 0, (176)
−γ1φt + (1− ρ)µ1t ·ma(s1t, a1t) = 0, (177)
−h′(lt + st) + (1− ρ)µ2t ·ms(s2t, a2t) = 0, (178)
−γ2φt + (1− ρ)µ2t ·ma(s2t, a2t) = 0, (179)
−µ1t + βEt [ϑvN1(N1t+1, N2t+1)− φt+1 + (1− ρ)µ1t+1] = 0, (180)
−µ2t + βEt [ϑvN2(N1t+1, N2t+1)− φt+1 + (1− ρ)µ2t+1] = 0. (181)
For notational convenience, we have used st(≡ s1t + s2t) in the displayed FOCs.
H.1 Static Efficiency — Walrasian “Cash” Good / Walrasian “Credit” Good
Because the Social Planner does not consider the methods by which transactions occur in the
decentralized economy, conditions (173) and (174) immediately imply that
ux1(x1t, x2t)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
= 1. (182)
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H.2 Static Efficiency — Consumption-Labor
Conditions (174) and (175) imply the standard static efficiency condition between (Walrasian)
consumption and labor
h′(lt + st)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
= zt. (183)
We could have instead used condition (173) to obtain this result because the Social Planner equates
λt = ux2(x1t, x2t) = ux1(x1t, x2t). However, given the setup of the decentralized cash-good/credit-
good economy below, expression (183) is a more convenient representation.
H.3 Static Efficiency — Consumption-Search
The FOCs on ait and sit, i ∈ {1, 2}, imply another (pair of) distinct static efficiency conditions
between (Walrasian) consumption and search activity for new customer relationships
h′(lt + st)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
=
γims(sit, ait)
ma(sit, ait)
. (184)
For Cobb-Douglas matching and its associated marginals,21 static efficiency is characterized by
h′(lt + st)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
= γiθit
ξ
1− ξ , (185)
in which ξ is the elasticity of the Cobb-Douglas matching function with respect to sit. Define, for
Cobb-Douglas matching,
MRTx2t,st = γiθit
ξ
1− ξ . (186)
H.4 Intertemporal Efficiency
The FOCs on ait and Nit+1, i ∈ {1, 2}, imply the (pair of) intertemporal efficiency conditions
γi
ma(sit, ait)
= (1−ρ)Et
[
βux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
(
ϑvNi(N1t+1, N2t+1)
ux2(x1t, x2t)
− 1 + γi
ma(sit+1, ait+1)
)]
. (187)
This (pair of) expression(s) for intertemporal efficiency are to be interpreted as the efficient ad-
vertising condition(s), or the efficient free entry condition(s) for advertisements. Note that we are
purposefully using ux2(x1t, x2t) here, due to the setup of the decentralized cash-good/credit-good
economy below.
21Cobb-Douglas matching has the properties:
1. m(st, at) = s
ξ
ta
1−ξ
t
2. ms(st, at) = ξs
ξ−1
t a
1−ξ
t = ξθ
1−ξ
t
3. ma(st, at) = (1− ξ)sξta−ξt = (1− ξ)θ−ξt
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Alternatively, we could use the FOCs on sit and Nit+1, i ∈ {1, 2}, to obtain an equivalent,
alternative, representation of the intertemporal efficiency conditions cast in terms of household
utility. This would have the interpretation of efficient searching time conditions on the part of
households.
We can similarly define MRS and MRT relevant for intertemporal efficiency. To do so, first
restrict attention to the non-stochastic case because it makes clearer the separation of components
of preferences from components of technology (due to endogenous covariance terms implied by the
expectation operator). As above, we purposefully use ux2(x1t, x2t) because of the setup of the
decentralized cash-good/credit-good economy below.
Using the (pair of) expressions immediately above, the IMRT(s) and hence intertemporal effi-
ciency, is (after some algebra) characterized by
ux2(x1t, x2t)
βux2(x1t+1, x2t+1)
=
(1− ρ)
[
ϑvNi (N1t+1,N2t+1)
ux2 (x1t+1,x2t+1)
− 1 + γima(sit+1,ait+1)
]
γi/ma(sit, ait)
, (188)
for i ∈ {1, 2}. The interpretation of the right-hand side is the period t + 1 expected marginal
utility gain from consuming non-Walrasian good i plus the expected future savings on advertising
for non-Walrasian good i.
Formally define, for i ∈ {1, 2},
IMRTx2t,x2t+1 =
(1− ρ)
[
ϑvNi (N1t+1,N2t+1)
ux2 (x1t+1,x2t+1)
− 1 + γima(sit+1,ait+1
]
γi/ma(sit, ait)
. (189)
H.5 Efficient Allocations
Efficient allocations are state-contingent functions for {x1t, x2t, lt, a1t, s1t, a2t, s2t, N1t+1, N2t+1, φt, µ1t, µ2t}
that satisfy: the resource constraint (170), the laws of motion (171) and (172), and all of the FOCs
(173) - (181), for given exogenous processes {zt, gt}.
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